This paper examines the pricing of public debt in a quantitative macroeconomic model with government default risk. Default may occur due to a fiscal policy that does not preclude a Ponzi game. When a build-up of public debt makes this outcome inevitable, households stop lending such that the...

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s (2001) results for interest rate feedback rules, the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for...

We develop a macroeconomic framework where money issupplied against only few eligible securities in open marketoperations. The relationship between the policy rate,expected inflation and consumption growth is affected bymoney market conditions, i.e. the varying liquidity value ofeligible assets...

This paper examines how money demand induced real balance effects contribute to the determination of the price level, as suggested by Patinkin (1949,1965), and if they affect conditions for local equilibrium uniqueness and stability. There exists a unique price level sequence that is consistent...

This paper examines monetary policy implementation in a sticky price model. The central bank’s plan under discretionary optimization is entirely forward-looking and exhibits multiple equilibrium solutions if transactions frictions are not negligibly small. The central bank can then implement...

This paper examines monetary policy implementation in a sticky price model. The central bank's plan under discretionary optimization is entirely forward-looking and exhibits multiple equilibrium solutions if transactions frictions are not negligibly small. The central bank can then implement...

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky pricemodel where the central bank supplies money outrightvia asset purchases and lends money temporarily againstcollateral. The terms of central bank lending affect ra-tioning of money and impact on macroeconomic aggre-gates. The central bank can...