Consider a general equilibrium model where agents may behave strategically. Specifically, suppose some firm issues new shares. If the primary market price is controlled by the issuing institution and investors' expectations on future equity prices are constant in their share purchases, the share...

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...

This paper studies a horizontal fare-pricing competition between two airlines having a single flight leg. Two distinct scenarios are considered. First, the two airlines price competition for the pre-committed booking limits is analysed. The problem is studied under deterministic price sensitive...

This paper studies a horizontal fare-pricing competition between two airlines having a single flight leg. Two distinct scenarios are considered. First, the two airlines price competition for the pre-committed booking limits is analysed. The problem is studied under deterministic price sensitive...