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Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction...
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We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759593
This paper studies a horizontal fare-pricing competition between two airlines having a single flight leg. Two distinct scenarios are considered. First, the two airlines price competition for the pre-committed booking limits is analysed. The problem is studied under deterministic price sensitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008539542
This paper studies a horizontal fare-pricing competition between two airlines having a single flight leg. Two distinct scenarios are considered. First, the two airlines price competition for the pre-committed booking limits is analysed. The problem is studied under deterministic price sensitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005751543