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Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2002
In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539675
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Let's collude
Aghadadashli, Hamid; Legros, Patrick - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012300998
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Compensation disclosures and strategic commitment : evidence from revenue-based pay
Bloomfield, Matthew J. - In: Journal of financial economics 141 (2021) 2, pp. 620-643
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013259816
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Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
Barreda Tarrazona, Iván J.; Georgantzís, Nikolaos; … - In: Economic modelling 54 (2016), pp. 205-217
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011642108
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Our product is unique : a note on a delegation game with differentiated products
Buchen, Clemens; Hartmann, Sven A.; Palermo, Alberto - 2021
substitutability than it really has. This is so either because managers are biased and perceive the good in this way, or because firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012595219
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Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2002
In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contests. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117869
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Relative Performance Evaluation, Sabotage and Collusion
Bloomfield, Matthew J. - 2020
Relative performance evaluation (“RPE”) is a useful tool for shielding risk averse agents from systematic uncertainty. However, RPE can also destroy firm value by encouraging executives to implement excessively aggressive product market strategies to improve their relative standing through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843268
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Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market : how does firm entry shape managerial incentives?
Dam, Kaniṣka; Robinson-Cortés, Alejandro - In: Mathematical social sciences 106 (2020), pp. 60-77
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434244
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Relative Performance Evaluation in an Oligopoly
Wu, Martin G. H. - 2012
no longer innocuous, because two firms can share unique shocks not shared by another, or all other firms, in an oligopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014174073
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Cross-Ownership and Green Managerial Delegation Contracts in a Mixed Oligopoly
Xing, Mingqing; Lee, Sang-Ho - 2023
responsibility (ECSR). We consider a mixed oligopoly under cross-ownership between the private firms and compare three cases of … find that private managers always undertake ECSR, whereas public managers do so when there is severe environmental damage …. We also find that the ECSR incentives for welfare-weighted public managers are always lower than for their profit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347768