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Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production

Helpman, Elhanan - 2002

We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469300

Targeted Export Promotion with Several Oligopolistic Industries

Dixit, Avinash K. - 1984

In this paper we ask whether a policy of targeted export promotion can raise domestic welfare when several oligopolistic industries all draw on the same scarce factor of production. Our point of departure is one of Cournot duopoly in which a single home firm competes with a single foreign firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477753

Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly

Eaton, Jonathan - 1983

In this paper we provide an integrative treatment of the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy under oligopoly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477861

Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation

Graham, John R. - 2011

We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461290

CEO-Board Dynamics

Graham, John R. - 2019

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479953

Managerial Miscalibration

Ben-David, Itzhak - 2010

Using a unique 10-year panel that includes more than 13,300 expected stock market return probability distributions, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are too narrow: realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462440

A Corporate Beauty Contest

Graham, John R. - 2010

We conduct beauty contest experiments, using close to 2,000 subjects to study the facial traits of CEOs. In one experiment we use pairs of photographs and find that subjects rate CEO faces as appearing more "competent" and less "likable" than non-CEO faces. Another experiment matches CEOs from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462745

Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Policies

Ben-David, Itzhak - 2007

Miscalibration is a standard measure of overconfidence in both psychology and economics. Although it is often used in lab experiments, there is scarcity of evidence about its effects in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and whether their miscalibration impacts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464935

Payout Policy in the 21st Century

Brav, Alon - 2003

factors that drive dividend and share repurchase policies. We find that managers are very reluctant to cut dividends, that … repurchases is viewed by managers as being more flexible than using dividends, permitting a better opportunity to optimize … investment. Managers like to repurchase shares when they feel their stock is undervalued and in an effort to affect EPS. Dividend …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469041

Matching and Sorting in a Global Economy

Grossman, Gene M. - 2013

, labor and "managers", each with a distribution of ability levels. Production combines a manager of some type with a group of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459150