We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main...

We propose a new solution concept for a game among oligopolists that simultaneously compete in several segmented markets. The motivation for this solution comes from international trade, but it also has applications in other areas. It is based on a three-stage extension of the two-stage...

Empirical studies have found that enhanced foreign competition can encourage or discourage innovation. To address this relationship, I examine a market structure in which a small number of large multi-product oligopolists compete with a large number of small single-product firms in the same...

We develop a model of large multinational enterprises, each one producing a continuum of products. These outsized firms compete as oligopolists in a domestic and foreign market, facing competitive pressure from single-product firms that engage in monopolistic competition. The multinational...