Similar Search Results

Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation

Jolls, Christine - 1998

coincided with an increasing reliance on stock options to compensate top managers, and stock options encourage managers to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472338

What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation

Goolsbee, Austan - 1997

This paper reexamines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995. The data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472482

The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets : Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment

Scharfstein, David S. - 1997

We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an … bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472852

Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation : Theory and Evidence

Aggarwal, Rajesh - 1996

We argue that strategic interactions between firms in an oligopoly can explain the puzzling lack of high …. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473194

Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control : Entrenchment versus Efficiency

Novaes, Walter - 1995

Recent capital structure theories have emphasized the role of debt in minimizing the agency costs that arise from the separation between ownership and control. In this paper we argue that capital structure choices themselves are affected by the same agency problem. We show that, in general, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473483

CEO Pay and Firm Performance : Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures

Joskow, Paul L. - 1994

This study explores the dynamic structure of the pay-for- performance relationship in CEO compensation and quantifies the effect of introducing a more complex model of firm financial performance on the estimated performance sensitivity of executive pay. The results suggest that current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473923

Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation : Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?

Rose, Nancy L. - 1994

Data for a sample of 558 CEOs over 1985-1990 suggest substantial compensation premia for managers of diversified firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474205

Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation : Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries

Akcigit, Ufuk - 2016

Managerial delegation is essential for firm growth. While firms in poor countries often shun outside managers and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456767

Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions : Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits

Aghion, Philippe - 2014

In this paper we analyze the problem of whether and/or when to replace a leader (agent) when no monetary rewards are available, and it is the leader's competence rather than effort that is being evaluated. The only decisions that the leader takes over time are whether to undertake risky but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458366

Matching Capital and Labor

Berk, Jonathan B. - 2014

30% of the value mutual fund managers add can be attributed to the firm's role in efficiently allocating capital amongst … its mutual fund managers. We find no evidence of a similar effect when a firm hires managers from another firm. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458526