Crises on external sovereign debt are typically defined as defaults. Such a definition accurately captures debt-servicing difficulties in the 1980s, a period of numerous defaults on bank loans. However, defining defaults as debt crises is problematic for the 1990s, when sovereign bond markets...

We explore a model intended to capture the interaction between exchange rate policy, fiscal policy, and outright default on foreign-currency denominated debt. We examine how the exchange rate affects the supply of short-term debt facing the government. We show that under a credible hard peg...

Currency boards operate differently from standard pegs. The former exhibit greater currency stability and lower transaction costs, inflation, and nominal interest rates, but are limited in their use of devaluation. We extend Drazen and Masson’s (1994) signaling model to consider the choice...

We examine the determinants of external crises, focusing on the role of foreign liabilities and their composition. Using a variety of statistical tools and comprehensive data spanning 1970-2011, we find that the ratio of net foreign liabilities (NFL) to GDP is a significant crisis predictor, and...

Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for an effective lender of last resort for sovereign states and on procedures for sovereign debt restructuring to help cope with global financial crises. Where private creditors use short-term debt to check sovereign debtor’s moral hazard, there...

This paper offers an in-depth review of the institutional arrangements underlying existing currency boards (CBAs) in Argentina (until 2001), Eastern Europe, and Asia. An index of precommitment is derived from an analysis of legislative frameworks and monetary policy operations. The index covers...

This paper shows that extending the convertibility guarantee of the traditional currency board to a second reserve currency brings about an automatic, market-driven change of the peg when the initial reserve currency appreciates beyond a specified level. The “dual” currency board thus...

Using a simple model, this paper shows how a strict monetary rule exhibits characteristics similar to those of an exchange rate anchor, in terms of a lack of robustness in the presence of adverse expectations (“bad dreams”). More specifically, as an anticipated devaluation under an exchange...

One distinguishable characteristic of emerging market economies is that they are not financially robust. These economies are incapable of smoothing out large external shocks, as sudden capital outflows imply large and abrupt swings in the real exchange rate. Using a small open-economy model,...

We characterize a country's exchange rate regime by how its central bank channels a capital account shock across three variables: exchange depreciation, interest rates, and international reserve flows. Structural vector autoregression estimates for Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey reveal such...