We use a two period model to analyze the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in an open regional economy. First, we describe the first best investment contract, we study the second best investment contract in the presence of private information, and then we...

We study a regional economy with a large number of entrepreneurs who own firms and who want to go public. Specifically, our analysis focuses on the contractual interaction between a representative risk averse entrepreneur who owns a firm and a risk neutral monopolistic investment bank that...

We analyze two hitherto little studied but salient questions concerning the trinity of asymmetric information, entrepreneurial activity, and the scope of fiscal policy in an open regional economy. First, we use a two period model to analyze the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and...

We use a two period model to analyze the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in an open regional economy. First, we describe the first best investment contract, we study the second best investment contract in the presence of private information, and then we...

We analyze two hitherto little studied but salient questions concerning the trinity of asymmetric information, entrepreneurial activity, and the scope of fiscal policy in an open regional economy. First, we use a two period model to analyze the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and...