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Adding tournament to tournament : combining between-team and within-team incentives

Majerczyk, Michael; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Tian, Yu - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012208911

Adding tournament to tournament : combining between-team and within-team incentives

Majerczyk, Michael; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Tian, Yu - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 166 (2019), pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012148971

The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

Brau, Rinaldo; Carraro, Carlo - In: Journal of regulatory economics 39 (2011) 2, pp. 111-142

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009245231

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Sheremeta, … - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 18 (2015) 4, pp. 609-669

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530677

Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants : An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - 2018

weaker contestants. The impact on revenue is more intricate. In contrast to theory, a strict bid-cap does not increase … revenue, but a mild bid-cap can increase revenue even when not predicted by theory. Our data also show that tie-breaking rules …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936241

Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants : An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol - 2016

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the “discouragement effect.” Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986649