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We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964
It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539694
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
distribution - mean and volatility - along an efficient frontier. Assuming that managers differ with respect to their marginal cost … of effort and their risk aversion we explore our model's comparative statics predictions in full detail. If managers … profits, and incentives is the natural outcome. Allowing in addition for adverse selection with respect to the managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457192
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contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
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"Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003627552
This paper investigates dynamically optimal risk-taking by an expected-utility maximizing manager of a hedge fund. We examine the effects of variations on a compensation structure that includes a percentage management fee, a performance incentive for exceeding a specified highwater mark, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003221920