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Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001474245
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How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489460
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Why do managers under-delegate? : a co-productive principal-agent model
Roels, Guillaume; Smirnov, Vladimir; Tsetlin, Ilia; … - 2023 - Revised version of 2021/36/TOM/DSC
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442033
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Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment
Offerman, Theo; Potters, Jan; Sonnemans, Joep - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000976205
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Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation
Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - 2003
We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001771977
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Common agency equilibria with discrete mechanisms and discrete types
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presenting a general algorithm to find the pure -strategy equilibria of this game, we use it to characterize these equilibria when the two principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624291
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Gift exchange in a multi-worker firm
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002256677
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Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst - 2001
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460980
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Reelection threshold contracts in politics
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013361017