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Living in two neighborhoods : social interactions in the LAB
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - 2003
Field evidence suggests that agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. Testing for such effects raises severe identification problems. We conduct an experiment that avoids these problems. The main design feature is that each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001771994
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A theory of reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind … ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also … the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001590591
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Social ties in a public good experiment
Dijk, Frans van; Sonnemans, Joep; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2000
The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001474389
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Tax competition and international public goods
Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Schjelderup, Guttorm - 2000
A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001554661
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Democratic mechanisms : double majority rules and flexible agenda costs
Gersbach, Hans - 2002
We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001689878
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The signalling power of sanctions in collective action problems
Weele, Joël J. van der (contributor) - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003483055
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Employment and distributional effects of restricting working time
Marimon, Ramon; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001389431
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Do social policies harm employment and growth?
Ploeg, Frederick van der - 2003
In economies with competitive labour markets social policies harm employment and output. In Europe, in particular, non-competitive labour markets with trade unions, efficiency wages and/or costly search and mismatch seem more realistic. Social policies such as progressive taxation or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750168
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Optimal design of intergovernmental grants under asymmetric information
Huber, Bernd; Runkel, Marco - 2003
This paper develops a theoretical explanation why it may be optimal for higher-level governments to pay categorical block grants or closed-ended matching grants to local governments. We consider a federation with two types of local governments which differ in the cost of providing public goods....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750832
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Hotelling tax competition
Wooders, Myrna Holtz; Zissimos, Benjamin - 2003
This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001757522