Similar Search Results

Delegation, promotion, and manager selection

Häusinger, Benjamin - 2019

misalignment between managers and the firm, these two purposes are in conflict. This is because the worker with the largest private …: employees that create lower expected profits as managers have yet better promotion prospects. That finding still holds when the … firm owner optimally chooses the promotion rule, the degree of delegation, and wage payments to both employees and managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138859

Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?

Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2017

If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895040

Multitask agents and incentives : the case of teaching and research for university professors

De Philippis, Marta - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410562

More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015 - June 2015, revised September 2015

In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340265

More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, optimistic beliefs, and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2017

Recent behavioral models argue in favor of avoidance of instrumental information. We explore the role of information avoidance in a real-effort setting. Our experiment offers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance of instrumental information exist, studying...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011751477

What do economists tell us about venture capital contracts

Tykvová, Tereza - 2000

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428358

Accounting as a credence good : an attempt to throw some light on the recent loss of relevance of German management accounting

Weißenberger, Barbara E. - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000969251

Optimal disclosure in tripartite signalling games

Yaari, Varda Lewinstein; Ronen, Joshua - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000820336

Delegation and information revelation

Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001512101

Reciprocity in dynamic employment relationships

Fahn, Matthias - 2019

This paper explores the optimal provision of dynamic incentives for employees with reciprocal preferences. Building on the presumption that a relational contract can establish a norm of reciprocity, I show that generous upfront wages that activate an employee’s reciprocal preferences are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126237