We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive...

We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise information about an unknown state of the world leads to a mean-preserving spread of beliefs. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain either a non-increasing mean or a...

Using an overlapping generations model, this paper describes interactions between nai͏̈ve and sophisticated hyperbolic discounters in general equilibrium. The nai͏̈fs, who overestimate their future propensity to save and hence over-forecast the future equilibrium asset prices, are exploited...

This paper discusses three alternative assumptions concerning household preferences (altruism, self-interest, and a desire for dynasty building) and shows that these assumptions have very different implications for bequest motives and bequest division. After reviewing some of the literature on...