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Executive compensation and stock options : an inconvenient truth

Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Donaldson, John B. - 2008

to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many high-proffile managers' compensation is in the form of various …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961700

Gibson, Rajna; Sohn, Matthias; Tanner, Carmen; Wagner, … - 2017

This paper studies how investors infer CEO commitment to honesty from earnings management and how these perceptions – in conjunction with investors’ own social and moral preferences – shape their investment choices. We conduct two laboratory experiments simulating investment choices. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626498

Director independence as strategic behavior

Wagner, Alexander F. (contributor) - 2007

This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550804

Executive compensation : the view from general equilibrium

Danthine, Jean-Pierre (contributor); … - 2007

firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non … and that maximizing the discounted sum of future dividends will be her objective. Linking managers' compensation to … overall economic performance is also required to make sure that managers use the appropriate stochastic discount factor to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550864

Why do U.S. CEOs pledge their own company's stock?

Fabisik, Kornelia - 2019

Between 2007 and 2016, 7.6% of publicly listed U.S. firms disclosed that their CEOs had pledged company stock as collateral for a loan. On average, CEOs pledge 38% of their shares. The mean loan value is an economically sizeable $65 million. CEOs use the funds to either double down (6.0%), hedge...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134769

Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less?

Fabisik, Kornelia; Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Stulz, René M.; … - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976932

Straight talkers and vague talkers : the effects of managerial style in earnings conference calls

Dzielinski, Michal; Wagner, Alexander F.; Zeckhauser, … - 2017

Managers conducting earnings conference calls display distinctive styles in their word choice. Some CEOs and CFOs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665854

Tips and tells from managers : how analysts and the market read between the lines of conference calls

Druz, Marina; Wagner, Alexander F.; Zeckhauser, Richard - 2015

The negativity of managerial word choice (managerial tone) on conference calls is a telltale indicator of a company's future. Specifically, increases in negativity, what we term bleak tone changes, strongly predict lower future earnings and greater uncertainty. However, decreases in negativity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011293487

Does protectionist anti-takeover legislation lead to managerial entrenchment?

Frattaroli, Marc - 2018

I study a protectionist anti-takeover law introduced in 2014 that covers a subset of all firms in the economy. The law decreased affected firms' likelihood of becoming the target of a merger or acquisition and had a negative impact on shareholder value. There is no evidence that management of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875653

Earnings management and managerial compensation

Bachmann, Kremena; Hens, Thorsten - 2017

This paper studies the earnings management behavior of a manager in a strategic game in which the manager may have incentives to avoid earnings below the analysts' consensus forecast and the analysts aiming to provide accurate forecasts behave as rational Bayesians. Our analysis reveals the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875852