Showing 1 - 10 of 63
We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661508
The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708402
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'SIAM Journal on Optimization', 2006, 16, 854-870. <P> It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping fi from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255864
To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have full information and learn using forecast rules specified as in the minimum state variable representation of the economy. Applying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294016
We exploit a unique opportunity to study how a large population of players in the field learn to play a novel game with a complicated and non-intuitive mixed strategy equilibrium.  We argue that standard models of belief-based learning and reinforcement learning are unable to explain the data,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011085123
We propose a simple payoff-based learning rule that is completely decentralized, and that leads to an efficient configuaration of actions in any n-person finite strategic-form game with generic payoffs.  The algorithm follows the theme of exploration versus exploitation and is hence stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009190182
We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708769
In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and theevolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behaviorin a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitiveability: more cognitively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133082
We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011120284
This paper analyses a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits.At least one of the arms is risky in the sense that it may not yield a lumpsum payoff. There is payoff externality between the players and they differ in their ability to learn across the risky arm. Either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883460