We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'SIAM Journal on Optimization', 2006, 16, 854-870. <P> It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping fi from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one...</p>

AMS classifications: 47H10; 54H25; 55M20; 90C33; 91B50

This paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and how to share the profit in a collaborative and...

A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have full information and learn using forecast rules specified as in the minimum state variable representation of the economy. Applying...

This paper analyses a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits.At least one of the arms is risky in the sense that it may not yield a lumpsum payoff. There is payoff externality between the players and they differ in their ability to learn across the risky arm. Either...

In this paper, I examine the effect of introducing heterogeneity between players in a model of strategic experimentation. I consider a two-armed bandit problem in continuous time with one safe arm and a risky arm. There are two players and each has an access to such a bandit. A player using the...

This paper considers a two-armed bandit problem with one safe arm and one risky arm. The risky arm if good, can potentially experience two kinds of arrivals. One is publicly observable and the other is private to the agent who experiences it. The safe arm experiences publicly observable arrivals...

We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...