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Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of “university …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672224

Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue

Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts. These scandals cause an enormous amount of damage, not only to the companies affected, but also to the market economy as a whole. As a solution, conventional wisdom suggests more monitoring and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760916

Lorenz meets rating but misses valuation

Camacho-Cuena, Eva (contributor); … - 2005

Using an experiment with material incentives, this paper investigates the violation of Lorenz relations in the case of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002796352

Compensating justice beats leaky buckets : an experimental investigation

Camacho-Cuena, Eva (contributor); … - 2005

Leaky-bucket transactions can be regarded as income transfers allowing for transaction costs. In its most rudimentary form, leaky-bucket transactions trace out the maximum leakageʺ of transaction costs before income inequality is exacerbated, or before a welfare loss is experienced. This notion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002796593

Collective and random fining versus tax/subsidy schemes to regulate non-point pollution : an experimental study

Camacho, Eva (contributor); Requate, Tilman (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

In this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms which are designed to deal with non-point source pollution: collective fining, random fining, and a tax-subsidy scheme. Our results show that collective and random fining schemes do not induce the...