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Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors : the impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design
Schmidt, Daniel (contributor); Wahrenburg, Mark (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001919095
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Insuring the uninsurable: brokers and incomplete insurance contracts
Doherty, Neil A.; Muermann, Alexander - Center for Financial Studies - 2005
How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can hold up the insurer for extra contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small to yield useful coverage....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986457
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Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors: The impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design
Schmidt, Daniel; Wahrenburg, Mark - Center for Financial Studies - 2003
reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more … participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant … money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958770
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Contractual Relations between European VC–Funds and Investors: The Impact of Reputation and Bargaining Power on Contractual Design
Schmidt, Daniel; Wahrenburg, Mark - Center for Financial Studies - 2003
reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more … participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant … money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022453
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Re-Thinking Reputation
Mell, Andrew - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011
Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.  In particular, it is … observe in the real world.  We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291911
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Career Concerns with Coarse Information
Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011
This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker's skill is revealed through output, wage is based on expected output, and so on assessed ability. Specifically, effort increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves a one-time breakthrough. Effort levels at different times are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352220
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The Quality of Information in Electronic Groups
Bacharach, Michael; Board, Oliver - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000
-weighted information may be maximized by a different regime, in which all replying is anonymous. Reputation effects play a key role in our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604981
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Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games
Faingold, Eduardo; Sannikov, Yuliy - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007
We study a class of continuous-time reputation games between a large player and a population of small players in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762590
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A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003
We enrich a simple two-person bargaining model by introducing "behavioral types" who concede more slowly than does the average person in the economy. The presence of behavioral types profoundly influences the choices of optimizing types. In equilibrium, concessions are calculated to induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762599
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Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets
Myatt, David P.; Dewan, Torun - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005
collective reputation with the wider membership of her cabinet; we show that heterogeneity of cabinet membership can play an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047938