reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more … participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant … money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as …

reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more … participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant … money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as …

Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.  In particular, it is … observe in the real world.  We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the …

-weighted information may be maximized by a different regime, in which all replying is anonymous. Reputation effects play a key role in our …

collective reputation with the wider membership of her cabinet; we show that heterogeneity of cabinet membership can play an …

changed at zero cost.  This paper examines the reputation mechanisms that keep this market working and considers whether they …