We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221711004498">'European Journal of Operational Research'</A>, 214(3), 493-500.<P>We study the existence problem of a zero point of a function defined on a finite set of elements of the integer lattice of the n-dimensional Euclidean space. It is assumed that the set is...</p></a>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'SIAM Journal on Optimization', 2007, 18, 290-308. <P> In this paper we present two general results on the existence of a discrete zero point of a function from the n-dimensional integer lattice Zn to the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn. Under...</p>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Mathematical Programming', ser. A, 2006, 108, 127-134. <P>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications', 2010, 144, 391-407. <p> Tucker's well-known combinatorial lemma states that for any given symmetric triangulation of the n-dimensional unit cube and for any integer labeling that assigns to...</p>

To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have full information and learn using forecast rules specified as in the minimum state variable representation of the economy. Applying...

We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...

I develop an equilibrium model with collateral constraints in which rational agents are uncertain and learn about the equilibrium mapping between fundamentals and collateral prices. Bayesian updating of beliefs by agents can endogenously generate booms and busts in collateral prices and largely...