To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have full information and learn using forecast rules specified as in the minimum state variable representation of the economy. Applying...

We give new proofs of existence of the limit of the discounted values for two person zero-sum games in the following frameworks: incomplete information, absorbing, recursive. The idea of these new proofs is to use some comparison criteria.

I develop an equilibrium model with collateral constraints in which rational agents are uncertain and learn about the equilibrium mapping between fundamentals and collateral prices. Bayesian updating of beliefs by agents can endogenously generate booms and busts in collateral prices and largely...

The present paper draws on the main issues in the production of scientific knowledge based upon grounded theory in management accounting research. This piece of work is a bibliographic study confronting grounded theory practices with the expectations of its founders (Glaser et Strauss, 1967; Strauss...

We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and...

Incorporating adaptive learning into macroeconomics requires assumptions about how agents incorporate their forecasts into their decision-making. We develop a theory of bounded rationality that we call finite-horizon learning. This approach generalizes the two existing benchmarks in the...

Cette communication s'interroge sur les rapports et les différences entre recherches pluridisciplinaires, interdisciplinaires et transdisciplinaires