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The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765471
This paper considers a realistic family of admission mechanisms, with multiple applications and application costs. Multiple applications impose serious coordination problems to colleges, but application costs restore stability. Without application costs and under incomplete information unstable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094082
In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181142