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Reputation in the Market for Stolen Data

Mell, Andrew - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

changed at zero cost. This paper examines the reputation mechanisms that keep this market working and considers whether they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133067

A Reputation Economy: Results from an Empirical Survey on Academic Data Sharing

Fecher, Benedikt; Friesike, Sascha; Hebing, Marcel; … - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2015

, nor the desire for scientific progress, but by individual reputation—expressed in (high ranked journal) publications. We … label this system a Reputation Economy. This special economy explains our findings that show that researchers have a nuanced … data sharing will only be widely adopted among research professionals if sharing pays in form of reputation. Thus, policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185752

Career Prospects and Effort Incentives: Evidence from Professional Soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2014

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185757

Pundits and Quacks

Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information about the ability of financial analysts? We show that as financial analysts become reputable, the market can get trapped: Investors optimally choose to ignore their private information, and blindly follow analyst recommendations. As time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240393

Career Concerns and Market Structure

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895652

Informational Opacity and Honest Certification

Pollrich, Martin; Wagner, Lilo - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2013

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing less precise information a certifier reduces the threat of capture. Opaque disclosure rules may reduce profits but also constrain feasible bribes. For large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010896178

Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets

Myatt, David P.; Dewan, Torun - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005

collective reputation with the wider membership of her cabinet; we show that heterogeneity of cabinet membership can play an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047938

Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games

Faingold, Eduardo; Sannikov, Yuliy - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

We study a class of continuous-time reputation games between a large player and a population of small players in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762590

A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

We enrich a simple two-person bargaining model by introducing "behavioral types" who concede more slowly than does the average person in the economy. The presence of behavioral types profoundly influences the choices of optimizing types. In equilibrium, concessions are calculated to induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762599

Re-Thinking Reputation

Mell, Andrew - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players. In particular, it is … observe in the real world. We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291911