Similar Search Results

Mell, Andrew - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players. In particular, it is … observe in the real world. We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291911

Career Concerns with Coarse Information

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker's skill is revealed through output, wage is based on expected output, and so on assessed ability. Specifically, effort increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves a one-time breakthrough. Effort levels at different times are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352220

The Quality of Information in Electronic Groups

Bacharach, Michael; Board, Oliver - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

-weighted information may be maximized by a different regime, in which all replying is anonymous. Reputation effects play a key role in our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604981

Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games

Faingold, Eduardo; Sannikov, Yuliy - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

We study a class of continuous-time reputation games between a large player and a population of small players in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762590

A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

We enrich a simple two-person bargaining model by introducing "behavioral types" who concede more slowly than does the average person in the economy. The presence of behavioral types profoundly influences the choices of optimizing types. In equilibrium, concessions are calculated to induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762599

Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These “high-performance work systems” are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543341

Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets

Myatt, David P.; Dewan, Torun - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005

collective reputation with the wider membership of her cabinet; we show that heterogeneity of cabinet membership can play an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047938

Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M.; Bartling, Björn - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817249

Reputation in the Market for Stolen Data

Mell, Andrew - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

changed at zero cost. This paper examines the reputation mechanisms that keep this market working and considers whether they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133067

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half … of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated … by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627837