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Reputation in the Market for Stolen Data

Mell, Andrew - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

changed at zero cost. This paper examines the reputation mechanisms that keep this market working and considers whether they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133067

Pundits and Quacks

Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information about the ability of financial analysts? We show that as financial analysts become reputable, the market can get trapped: Investors optimally choose to ignore their private information, and blindly follow analyst recommendations. As time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240393

Incentives and Reputation when Names can be Replaced: Valjean Reinvented as Monsieur Madeleine

Vial, Bernardita; Zurita, Felipe - Instituto de Economía, Facultad de Ciencia Económicas … - 2013

high quality. A firm may want to start over under a new name in order to avoid market punishment, if the reputation carried …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734536

Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics

Vial, Bernardita; Zurita, Felipe - Instituto de Economía, Facultad de Ciencia Económicas … - 2013

price-takers. Entrants have an endogenous reputation uE. In the steady-state equilibrium, uE is the lowest reputation among …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010774072

Career Concerns and Market Structure

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895652

Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets

Myatt, David P.; Dewan, Torun - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005

collective reputation with the wider membership of her cabinet; we show that heterogeneity of cabinet membership can play an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047938

On Reputational Rents as an Incentive Mechanism in Competitive Markets

Vial, Bernardita; Felipe Zurita. - Instituto de Economía, Facultad de Ciencia Económicas … - 2009

This paper shows that more intense competition may improve, rather than hamper, the chances that a market for an experience good or service overcomes the problems caused by informational asymmetries. This, in spite of the fact that intensified competition diminishes the reputational rents that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005002718

Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy in Continuous-Time Games

Faingold, Eduardo; Sannikov, Yuliy - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

We study a class of continuous-time reputation games between a large player and a population of small players in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762590

A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

We enrich a simple two-person bargaining model by introducing "behavioral types" who concede more slowly than does the average person in the economy. The presence of behavioral types profoundly influences the choices of optimizing types. In equilibrium, concessions are calculated to induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762599

Competitive Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring

Vial, Bernardita - Instituto de Economía, Facultad de Ciencia Económicas … - 2008

In this paper we analyze a reputation-based mechanism that sustains the provision of high quality in a market for an … experience good. In contrast to existing models of reputation, however, we consider a competitive market: there is a continuum of … an invariant long run distribution of firms' reputations: each firm's reputation changes every period even in the long …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212286