This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing less precise information a certifier reduces the threat of capture. Opaque disclosure rules may reduce profits but also constrain feasible bribes. For large...

We show that the observation by a principal of the effectiveness of an expert‘s action could induce the expert to lie, damaging the principal. A career-minded expert receives a private-informative signal about the real state of the world, and then he takes an action that can match or not the...

This paper presents a theoretical framework to describe the behaviour of the credit rating agencies(CRAs) during the crisis, surveying some reputational game models. CRAs have been blamed of inflating ratings of the new credit risk transfer products (CRTs) and of acting in favour of issuers...

In a model of repeated games, we determine the conditions under which cooperation is an equilibrium outcome among the G-20 countries. We consider first, that members are uncertain about the lifespan of the G-20. Second, the nature of member countries and their interrelations can change because...

This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker's skill is revealed through output, wage is based on expected output, and so on assessed ability. Specifically, effort increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves a one-time breakthrough. Effort levels at different times are...

We analyze the effects of CEOs' layoff risk on their risk choice while overseeing a firm. A CEO, whose managerial ability is unknown, is fired if her expected ability is below average. Her risk choice changes the informativeness of output and market's belief about her ability. She can decrease...