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La fabrique de programmes de recherche incitatifs innovants

Portier-Maynard, Anne - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011

programme. The study of this tool design, both at the strategy level and at the object level, is based on four approaches: the … design regarding to industrial models and to the strategy-as-practice approach. It also highlights leverages that can be … mobilized in order to design innovative research programmes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861638

The place of contract in organizational awareness: deconstructing process, market and connectedness

Scott, Susan V.; Paris, Carolyn - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

Throughout modern business history, contract has been used as an organizational technology that holds counterparties in formal or legally binding agreements. The proliferation of contract prompted the emergence of professional contract managers who played an important but relatively peripheral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744884

Fabriquer ensemble la stratégie : D’une démarche de Prospective Stratégique à une plateforme « d’Open Strategizing » chez BASF Agro de 1995 à 2012

Parize-Suffrin, Claudya - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2012

opportunities for collaboration on a community way. They expanded together a design space or interact the knowledge and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074682

L’innovation managériale de l'invention à la diffusion. Analyse du processus d’établissement d’une innovation managériale à partir du cas de la méthode 5 steps

Canet, Emilie - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2012

, evolution dynamics and design system. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074706

Forming Efficient Networks

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247843

Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments

Mutuswami, Suresh; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247858

Efficient Bidding with Externalities

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823915

Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168502

Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities

R?bert F. Veszteg - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582597

Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582632