A counter example to the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) finding of the impossibility of informationally efficient markets is produced using discrete choice dynamics to govern the evolution of the trader population that choose between being informed or uninformed based on past performance.

In a dynamic asset pricing model informed traders receive a noisy signal of the value of a risky asset while uninformed traders learn to extract the information from the price. The relative popularity of the two strategies depends on past performance. The asymptotic properties of the model and...

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation with small decay, and this for all increasing benefit functions of the players. We show that as long as the population is large enough, this set contains large- as well as small-diameter...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

Investors select how to distrubute funds between a number of projects. This paper departs from the standard financial market model by endogenizing the intrinsic value of the assets to be dependend upon the amount of funding they attract. Investment strategies based on fundamental and a momentum...

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection. Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote on the project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability that good decisions are...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

An increasing proportion of transactions in two-sided markets are being mediated by online platforms. Presumably, agents choose to use online platforms because they have a lower transaction cost technology compared to alternatives. I use data from a growing online platform that matches travelers...