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Looking beyond the CEO: executive compensation at banks
Demsetz, Rebecca S.; Saidenberg, Marc R. - Federal Reserve Bank of New York - 1999
The literature on executive compensation at banks has proceeded largely under the assumption that a single elasticity … tournament pay suggest that this assumption may be incorrect. We test the single-elasticity assumption by comparing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005420489
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Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry
John, Kose; Mehran, Hamid; Qian, Yiming - Federal Reserve Bank of New York - 2007
We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks’ unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005420632