In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...

In this paper we show the consequences of applying a panel unit root test when testing for a purchasing power parity relationship. The distribution of the tests investigated, including the IPS test of Im et al (1997), are influenced by a common stochastic trend which is usually not accounted...

We propose a seasonal cointegration model [SECM] for quarterly data which includes variables with different numbers of unit roots and thus needs to be transformed in different ways in order to yield stationarity. A Monte Carlo simulation is carried out to investigate the consequences of...

In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and...

In this paper, I analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations of myopic best repliers, better repliers and imitators. In each period, one individual from each of n populations, one for each player role, is drawn to play and chooses a pure strategy...

We show how it is possible to generate multivariate data which have moments arbitrary close to the desired ones. They are generated as linear combinations of variables with known theoretical moments. It is shown how to derive the weights of the linear combinations in both the univariate and the...