Presented by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and Brandeis International Business School, New York, New York, February 27, 2009

Presentation by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at The Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, May 5, 2010

Opening remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 53rd Economic Conference, Understanding Inflation and the Implications for Monetary Policy: A Phillips Curve Retrospective, Chatham,...

Remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at The Spread between Primary and Secondary Mortgage Rates: Recent Trends and Prospects workshop, New York, New York, December 3, 2012.

Presentation by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for The Forecasters Club of New York, September 29, 2010

Remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at the U. S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York, New York, February 22, 2013.

The appropriate role for equity prices in monetary policy deliberations has been hotly debated for some time. Recent work suggests that equity prices have affected monetary policy decisions above and beyond their indirect effect on the traditional goal variables of the FOMC. However, the...

A number of recent papers have explored monetary policy options, including inflation targeting and inflation forecast targeting (notably Svensson (1999a, 1999b, 2000)) and price level targeting (Wolman 2000, Batini and Yates 1999, Blinder 1999). Most papers explore "optimal" monetary policy in...

Recently, several central banks have lost their bank supervisory responsibilities, in part because it has not been shown that supervisory authority improves the conduct of monetary policy. This paper finds that confidential bank supervisory information could help the Board staff more accurately...

This paper estimates a New Keynesian model to draw inferences about the behavior of the Federal Reserve’s unobserved inflation target. The results indicate that the target rose from 1- 1/4 percent in 1959 to over 8 percent in the mid-to-late 1970s before falling back below 2-1/2 percent in...