This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

Remarks at the ACI 2010 World Congress, Sydney, Australia.

Remarks at the National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference, Arlington, Virginia

Remarks at Global Interdependence Center Central Banking Series Event, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Remarks by Brian P. Sack before the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City.

Remarks at the Annual Meeting with Primary Dealers, New York City.

This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

Granting central banks independence from short-term political control is widely assumed to decrease inflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to price stability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behavior in a sample of seventeen OECD countries for evidence of...

Does the adoption of an inflation target by a country have an effect on that country's rate of inflation and on inflation's interaction with real economic variables? Does inflation targeting alter private-sector expectations? The question of effectiveness must be posed as a counterfactual -did...