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Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Mauleon, Ana; Vergote, Wouter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965189

The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090

Finding Maxmin Allocations in Cooperative and Competitive Fair Division

Dall'Aglio, Marco; Luca, Camilla Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421244

Dynamic Multilateral Markets

Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131110

Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336

The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis

Montero, Maria - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674342

Pairing Games and Markets

Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781883

Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation

Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008013

A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin

Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423099