Showing 1 - 10 of 138
regular citizens do not become more dishonest in response to crime-related reminders. Moreover, our experimental measure of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277310
In a recent paper Engelmann and Strobl claim that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is far more important than inequity aversion. Here we show that the relevance of the efficiency motive is largely restricted to students of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627893
We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply the classification analysis by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and find that a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627932
This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817256
Is competition perceived as a fair procedure? We report data from laboratory experiments where a powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers. Sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in counterproductive behavior to punish the buyer. We find that the same unfavorable terms of trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817309
The paper analyzes the infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining game between agents with inequity-averse preferences. Without prior investments, the model predicts a shift of the outcome towards equal division. Asymmetric investments affect the ex-post bargaining outcome, giving an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627959
In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers seem to hold strong entitlements that shape negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627849
Laboratory experiments are an important methodology in economics, especially in the field of behavioral economics. However, it is still debated to what extent results from laboratory experiments can be applied to field settings. One highly important question with respect to the external validity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627987
This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of gift-exchange for charitable giving. Roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent to potential donors in the experiment. One third of the letters contained no gift, one third contained a small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628006
Cason and Plott (2014) show that subjects’ misconception about the incentive properties of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) value elicitation procedure can generate data patterns that look like - and might thus be misinterpreted as evidence for - preferences constructed from endowments or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272684