The minority game is a simple congestion game in which the players’ main goal is to choose among two options the one that is adopted by the smallest number of players. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria and the limiting behavior of several well-known learning processes in the minority...

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...

This paper gives a critical account of the minority game literature. The minority game is a simple congestion game: players need to choose between two options, and those who have selected the option chosen by the minority win. The learning model proposed in this literature seems to differ...

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation with small decay, and this for all increasing benefit functions of the players. We show that as long as the population is large enough, this set contains large- as well as small-diameter...

The paper analyses a simple reinforcing dynamics. The dynamics can be interpreted as a learning dynamics with fixed aspiration level. All payoffs are assumed to be above this aspiration level, therefore all strategies are reinforcing. Different versions of the dynamics exhibit different...

We study boundedly rational players in an interactive situation. Each player follows a simple choice procedure in which he reacts optimally against a combination of actions of his opponents drawn at random from the distribution generated by a player's beliefs. By imposing a consistency...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection. Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote on the project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability that good decisions are...

A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its...