Showing 1 - 10 of 33
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583545
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532158
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532170
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501955
This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649802
This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785856
We extend Akerlof ’s (1970) “Market for Lemons” by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes’ rule but take the noisy signal at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366341
In a market where sellers are heterogeneous with respect of the quality of their good and are more informed than buyers, high quality sellers' chances to trade might depend on their ability to inform buyers about the quality of the goods they offer. We study how the strength of competition among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040696
We consider a model of securities issues where the quality of securities is private information to the issuer, and firms of higher quality are more reluctant to issue securities than low quality firms. We show that, when the issuer directly trades with investors, market breakdown may occur. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040705