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Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly
Hu, Luke - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556728
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Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers’ Bids Determine Royalty Rates
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms’ bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501954
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Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
of combining auctions and royalty contracts for losers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501956
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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed–fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739670
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Innovation Contests with Entry Auction
Giebe, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583545
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Seller Competition by Mechanism Design
Damianov, Damian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835726
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The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching
Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008490104
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The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk
Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532158
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Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller
Lamping, Jennifer - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532170
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Searching the eBay Marketplace
Sailer, Katharina - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
from a sequence of eBay auctions. First the aspect of bidding in a marketplace environment is developed. Form the simple … a "reservation bid" for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121206