After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...

Perfectly discriminating contests (or all pay auction) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their ability to fight in the contest. This paper studies a two...

We analyze firms’ investment behavior, differentiating firms according to the cash flow levels they experience during their lifecycles. We consequently consider the firm as the basic unit and not firm-year observations. Firms with persistent positive cash flow show higher investment-cash flow...

In this paper, we provide general closed-form solutions to the incomplete-market random-coefficient dynamic optimization problem without the restrictive assumption of exponential or HARA utility function. Moreover, we explicitly express the optimal portfolio as a function of the optimal...

In this paper I ask whether a model of ¯rm capital accumulation with entry and exit calibrated to match the investment regularities of U.S. establishments is capable of generating the dependence of ¯rm dynamics on size and age. Firms face uncertainty in the form of idiosyncratic productivity...