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Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453

Relative Performance Evaluation and Earnings Management

Infuehr, Jakob - 2018

compensation contracts. In this paper, I highlight one weakness of relative performance evaluation. When earnings management is … possible, benchmarking creates stronger incentives for misreporting performance measures compared to competitor-independent pay …. The optimal contract will depend less on a correlated benchmark if it is easier for the manager to misreport performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935787

Agency Costs and Enforcement of Management Controls : Analyzing Punishments for Perpetrators of Economic Crimes

Healy, Paul M. - 2018

We examine the severity of punishments for employees who perpetrate economic crimes to understand how aggressively organizations enforce compliance with management control systems. Our dataset comprises 608 organizations around the world that identified they experienced economic crime. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935944

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor - 2010

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137464

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu - 2010

performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146587