Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Several studies have documented that employer incentives, in form of experience rating, co-insurance or deductibles, could decrease the social insurance usage. Such employer incentives may though have unintended side effects, as it gives employers incentives to transfer the costs to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273955
In 1998 the Swedish national sickness insurance policy changed to allow additional compensation from e.g. collective agreements after the 90th day of absence without a reduction of the public sickness benefit. We estimate the effects of this policy change on the duration of sickness absence for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317968
This paper studies interrelations between two benefits in the Swedish social insurance system: the sickness insurance and the temporary parental benefit. The level of compensation differs between the two benefits creating an economic incentive for parents to claim temporary parental benefit when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321128
Previous research suggests that there are substantial interactions between the unemployment insurance (UI) and the sickness insurance (SI) in Sweden. Moral hazard arises in the interplay between these two social insurance systems, since by reporting sick an unemployed person can postpone the UI...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273963
The paper exploits a unique social experiment carried out in 1988 in Sweden to identify the effect of monitoring on sickness absence. The treatment consists of postponing the first formal point of monitoring during a sickness absence spell, a requirement for a doctor’s certificate, from day...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317921
This paper looks at a specific type of moral hazard that arises in the interplay between two large public insurance systems in Sweden, namely the sickness insurance (SI) and the unemployment insurance (UI). Moral hazard can arise from the benefit size structure as for some unemployed persons,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317946
Sweden has obligatory sickness and disability insurance which is both financed (from payroll taxes) and administrated by the government. In order to receive sickness benefits, insured individuals must have certificates issued by a medical doctor. Since health care is administrated at the county...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321109
This paper estimates the effects of early interventions in the Swedish sickness insurance system. The aim of the interventions is to screen and, further to, rehabilitate sick listed individuals. We find that the early interventions - in contrast to what is expected - increase the inflow into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321123