I study when a firm prefers to be transparent about pay using a simple multidimensional signaling model. Pay transparency within the firm means that a worker can learn about his own worker-firm match from another worker's pay. This can either encourage or discourage workers-which affects...

This paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on the taxation of top-income earners by empirically investigating the impact of tax policy changes on pay without performance. Using data on executive compensation in the United States, I compare the sensitivity of executive compensation to...

Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this finding in terms of the "beneficial constraint" arising from stronger employment protection in France, which provides...

This research investigates any connections between executive pay incentives and share buybacks, and between share buybacks and investment levels. It expands the existing evidence base with UK-specific data using econometric, case study and survey techniques. The report will be followed by...

This study explores the relationships between CEO performance targets, the pay incentives associated with those targets, and firm investment for companies listed on the FTSE All-Share index (as of April 2020) from 2013 to 2019. The study has 3 aims: explore the prevalence of different...

This paper examines the reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation contracts. In our sample of international publicly traded firms, a rapidly growing fraction incorporate ESG metrics in the compensation schemes of their top executives. Our analysis links the reliance on these metrics to...