Showing 1 - 6 of 6
includes an experimentation component reflecting the endogeneity of information. We develop algorithms to solve numerically for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010298360
Consider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the e.ciency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable e.ort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263147
Recent work in the field of mechanism design has led some researchers to propose institutional changes that would permit parties to enter into nonmodifiable contracts, which is not possible under current contract law. This paper demonstrates that it may well be socially desirable not to enforce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263148
We study an adverse selection problem in which information that is imperfectly correlated with the agent's type becomes … bad states may be strengthened. Hence, ex post information can reduce efficiency. In contrast, if the agent's utility is ….g., whether the agent is in a "buyer" or "seller" position. In both cases, however, additional information need not improve the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538996
Consider an employer who wants her employee to work hard. As is well known from the efficiency wage literature, the employer must pay the (wealth-constrained) employee a positive rent to provide incentives for exerting unobservable effort. Alternatively, the employer could make effort observable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003126397
Recent work in the field of mechanism design has led some researchers to propose institutional changes that would permit parties to enter into nonmodifiable contracts, which is not possible under current contract law. This paper demonstrates that it may well be socially desirable not to enforce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003126403