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Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453

Early versus late effort in dynamic agencies with unverifiable information

Schöndube, Jens Robert - In: Business research 1 (2008) 2, pp. 165-186

determinants of this trade-off and demonstrate its implications for performance measurement and information system design. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783883

Earnings management and measurement error

Hofmann, Christian - In: Business research 1 (2008) 2, pp. 149-163

incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN … a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790182

Respect as an Incentive

Eriksson, Tor - 2010

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137464

Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence

Lefebvre, Mathieu - 2010

performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146587

Determinants and consequences of clawback provisions in management compensation contracts : a structured literature review on empirical evidence

Velte, Patrick - In: Business research 13 (2020) 3, pp. 1417-1450

quality (reduced re-/misstatements), better pay-for-performance sensitivity, increased firm performance, greater value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422403