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We study the subsidization of extra jobs in a general equilibrium framework. While the previous literature focuses on symmetric marginal employment subsidies where firms are rewarded when they increase employment but punished when they reduce their workforce, we consider an asymmetric scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264237
We reassess the quot;scarringquot; hypothesis by Clark et al. (2001), which states that unemployment experienced in the … scar from past unemployment operates via worsened expectations of becoming unemployed in the future, and that it is future … insecurity that makes people unhappy. Hence, the terminology should be altered by one letter: past unemployment quot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012768534
We study the subsidization of extra jobs in a general equilibrium framework. While the previous literature focuses on symmetric marginal employment subsidies where firms are rewarded when they increase employment but punished when they reduce their workforce, we consider an asymmetric scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316797
In this paper, we attempt to renew the interest in marginal employment subsidies. Such subsidies are paid only for a firm's additional employment exceeding some reference level and create larger employment stimuli at lower fiscal costs than general wage subsidies for all workers. If the hiring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317599