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More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015

informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346303

Gift exchange in the lab - it is not (only) how much you give ...

Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Steve - 2010

An important aspect in determining the effectiveness of gift exchange relations in labor markets is the ability of the worker to "repay the gift" to the employer. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment where we vary the wage and the effect of the worker's effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937791

Managerial payoff and gift exchange in the field

Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen G. - 2012

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. The results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We collect information on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488990

Measuring ratchet effects within a firm : evidence from a field experiment varying contractual commitment

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce S. - 2014

We present results from a field experiment designed to measure the importance of managerial commitment to a contract within a firm that pays its workers piece rates. In the tree planting industry the piece rate paid to workers is determined as a function of the difficulty of the terrain to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384384

Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877

Social relations and relational incentives

Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2012

relations ; incentives ; relational contracts ; efficiency wages ; subjective performance evaluation ; Nash bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540101

CEO compensation : evidence from the field

Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021

explains why flow pay responds to performance, even though CEOs’ equity holdings already provide substantial consumption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217

Asymmetric taxation and performance-based incentive contracts

Niemann, Rainer - 2011

This paper analyzes the effects of symmetric and asymmetric taxation on performance-based versus fixed remuneration … less frequently. Fixed remuneration contracts are penalized more heavily by asymmetric taxation than performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011369

Balanced scorecards : a relational contract approach

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2021

performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … where the agent gets a bonus if a weighted sum of per-formance outcomes on the various tasks (the index) exceeds a hurdle … this reason be beneficial. For a similar reason, the principal may also want to include verifiable performance measures in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438700

Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations

Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2018

Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927889