on perceived signaling and human capital effects. We elicit counterfactual labor market expectations for the hypothetical …-individual fixed effects models, we document substantial expected labor market returns from signaling, whereas perceived productivity …

on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to … ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act … one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of …

unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching. …

It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the … (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation. -- reciprocity ; gift-exchange ; signaling game …

We propose a signaling model of student enrollment dynamics based on probabilities of completion of studies, under …

information between firms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching markets. Specifically …A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching … facilitates match formation. -- Matching Markets ; Signaling …