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More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015

informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346303

Gift exchange in the lab - it is not (only) how much you give ...

Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Steve - 2010

An important aspect in determining the effectiveness of gift exchange relations in labor markets is the ability of the worker to "repay the gift" to the employer. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment where we vary the wage and the effect of the worker's effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937791

Managerial payoff and gift exchange in the field

Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen G. - 2012

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. The results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We collect information on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488990

Measuring ratchet effects within a firm : evidence from a field experiment varying contractual commitment

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce S. - 2014

We present results from a field experiment designed to measure the importance of managerial commitment to a contract within a firm that pays its workers piece rates. In the tree planting industry the piece rate paid to workers is determined as a function of the difficulty of the terrain to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384384

Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877

Social relations and relational incentives

Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2012

relations ; incentives ; relational contracts ; efficiency wages ; subjective performance evaluation ; Nash bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540101

Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts

Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008

This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314

Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through …-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218453

CEO compensation : evidence from the field

Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021

explains why flow pay responds to performance, even though CEOs’ equity holdings already provide substantial consumption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217

Asymmetric taxation and performance-based incentive contracts

Niemann, Rainer - 2011

This paper analyzes the effects of symmetric and asymmetric taxation on performance-based versus fixed remuneration … less frequently. Fixed remuneration contracts are penalized more heavily by asymmetric taxation than performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011369