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Fishing for excuses and performance evaluation

Larmande, François; Ponssard, Jean-Pierre - 2014

performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors … principal to prefer a policy of adjusting ex post the performance measure for the information provided by the agent to a policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229868

More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015

informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346303

Gift exchange in the lab - it is not (only) how much you give ...

Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen - 2010

An important aspect in determining the effectiveness of gift exchange relations in labor markets is the ability of the worker to "repay the gift" to the employer. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment where we vary the wage and the effect of the worker's effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937791

Managerial payoff and gift exchange in the field

Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen - 2012

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. The results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We collect information on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488990

Hidden benefits of reward : a field experiment on motivation and monetary incentives

Kvaløy, Ola; Nieken, Petra; Schöttner, Anja - 2013

interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only if it is accompanied … by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay reduces performance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. By … adding motivational sentences to an otherwise neutral explanation of the work task, the effect of performance pay goes from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009793159

Incentives to motivate

Kvaløy, Ola; Schöttner, Anja - 2014

We present a model in which a motivator can take costly actions - or what we call motivational effort - in order to reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250173

Measuring ratchet effects within a firm : evidence from a field experiment varying contractual commitment

Bellemare, Charles; Shearer, Bruce S. - 2014

We present results from a field experiment designed to measure the importance of managerial commitment to a contract within a firm that pays its workers piece rates. In the tree planting industry the piece rate paid to workers is determined as a function of the difficulty of the terrain to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010384384

Social relations and relational incentives

Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2012

relations ; incentives ; relational contracts ; efficiency wages ; subjective performance evaluation ; Nash bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540101

Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principalagent model to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2015

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405134